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REGULATION OF AIR TRAFFIC-THE D.C. CIRCUIT
HOLDS THAT THE FAA HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO ALTER FLIGHT ROUTES TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT
OF AIRCRAFT NOISE ON RESIDENTIAL AREAS
Huy LY*

re-

OWNERS around airports
"state and local noise ordinances and nuiTRADITIONALLY,
lied on ineffective PROPERTY

sance and inverse condemnation claims" to ameliorate the
adverse effects of aircraft noise in their communities.' As levels
of air traffic and federal involvement in controlling aircraft
noise increased, Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act
(Act) and subsequently delegated to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) "broad authority to control and regulate the
use of navigable airspace and aircraft operations" in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103.2 Congress also added § 44715(a), which broadly authorizes the FAA to set standards for aircraft noise measurement
and to prescribe "regulations to control and abate aircraft
noise. "3 However, neither § 40103 nor § 44715(a) explicitly addresses whether the FAA can regulate air traffic for the purpose
of residential noise abatement.'
The D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Helicopter Ass'n International v. FAA answers this question.5 In § 40103(b) (1), Congress
requires the agency to "develop plans and policy for the use of
the navigable airspace and [to] assign by regulation or order the
use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and
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I Kristin L. Falzone, Comment, Airport Noise Pollution: Is There a Solution in
Sight?, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 769, 771, 775 (1999).
2 Id. at 781-82, 800-01; 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2006).
3 49 U.S.C. § 44715 (a) (2006); see Falzone, supra note 1, at 783.
4 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44715(a); see also Falzone, supra note 1, at 782-83.
5 See Helicopter Ass'n Int'l v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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the efficient use of airspace."6 Subsection (b) (2) further provides that the agency "shall prescribe air traffic regulations on
the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for
. . . protecting individuals and property on the ground."7 Having
considered § 40103's language, the D.C. Circuit correctly held
that § 40103(b) (2) authorizes the FAA to set air traffic procedures to protect individuals and property on the ground from
the adverse effects of aircraft noise." On the other hand, the
court unwisely incorporated common law nuisance into its analysis, though this approach does not interfere with the FAA's substantive rights and obligations afforded by its general authority

in § 40103.9

Helicopter Association International, Inc. (HAI) is a professional trade association representing small entities that provide
leisure flights to New Yorkers traveling to eastern Long Island.' 0
Traditionally, flights from New York to eastern Long Island followed one of three paths: (1) the north, (2) the middle, or (3)
the south." However, many helicopter operators began to prefer flying along the north path to save time and avoid weather
delays." In 2008, in response to growing public apprehension
over the helicopter noise plaguing the communities of northern
Long Island, the FAA established the North Shore Helicopter
Route (Route), which is located approximately one mile offshore." The Route was designed to reduce the impact of noise
on northern Long Island communities, allow pilots to reach
their destinations without additional equipment, and minimize
safety issues by limiting interaction with other aircraft." The
FAA initially stated that use of the Route was voluntary.' 5
In 2010, the FAA received more than 900 noise complaints
during a short thirty-day comment period.' 6 Some commenters
6 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (1).
7 Id. § 40103(b) (2) (emphasis added).
8 See Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 433-34.
9 See id. at 434.
10 Initial Brief for Petitioner at 7, Helicopter Ass'n Int'l v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1335); Initial Brief for the Respondent at 46, Helicopter
Ass'n Int'l v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1335).
11 Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 431.
12 Id. at 431-32.

13 Id. at 432; see The New York North Shore Helicopter Route, 77 Fed. Reg.
39,911, 39,911-12 (July 6, 2012) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
14 The New York North Shore Helicopter Route, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,911-12.
15 Id. at 39,911.
16 Id. at 39,913.
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"noted that the helicopter noise interfere [d] with sleep, conversation, and outdoor activities, while others complained that the
helicopters flew] so low that their walls vibrated." 7 Recognizing the need to assess the noise impact, the FAA issued the New
York North Shore Helicopter Route (Final Rule) requiring all
civil helicopter pilots to use the Route for two years." The Final
Rule will expire if "no meaningful improvement" occurs." In
addition, the Final Rule includes exceptions for helicopter pilots to deviate from the Route "for reasons of safety, weather, or
to transit to [their] destination [s]."2o

Displeased with the FAA's decision, HAI petitioned to overturn the Final Rule, arguing, among other things, that § 40103
is limited by subsection (b) (1)'s focus on safety and that the
Act's pertinent provisions confined aircraft noise regulations to
technology certification and to the vicinity of airports. 2 1 In response, the FAA argued that the Final Rule is authorized by
§ 40103(b) (2) or, alternatively, by § 44715(a).2 2 Writing for the
court, Judge Rodgers applied the two-step test set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. to determine whether the FAA exceeded § 40103(b) (2)'s congressional
limits. 23 This test involves an assessment of (1) whether Congress's intent is clear, and (2) if Congress's intent is not clear,
whether the agency's regulation is a permissible interpretation
of the statute.2 4 In addition, the court must defer to the FAA's
statutory interpretation under Chevron's second step.25 Upon review, the court affirmed the Final Rule under § 40103(b) (2) but
declined to address § 44715(a) as an alternative basis of
authority.2 '
To begin, the D.C. Circuit applied the first step of Chevron's
two-step analysis by determining whether Congress clearly delegates to the FAA in § 40103(b) (2) the authority to prescribe air
traffic regulations to protect individuals and property from the
adverse effects of aircraft noise. In Regents of the University of
17
18

19
20
21

Id.
Id. at 39,911, 39,918.
Id. at 39,918.
Id.
Helicopter Ass'n Int'l v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27

at 435.
Id. at 433-35.
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California v. Public Employment Relations Board, the Supreme
Court looked at two main factors for determining Congress's intent: (1) the normal meaning of the statutory language, and (2)
whether the statute's legislative history suggests a narrow or
broad reading of the statutory language. 2 Applying Regents' first
factor, the D.C. Circuit concluded that § 40103(b) (2)'s term
"protect"-defined as "to cover or shield from that which would
injure, destroy, or detrimentally affect"-sufficiently encompasses protection from aircraft noise.2 ' Thus, "by giving the language its normal meaning,"3 0 the court found clear Congress's
intent to allow the FAA to alter air traffic for the purpose of
aircraft noise abatement.3 ' In reaching its conclusion, the court
also relied on the common law of torts, which has long deemed
the production of certain noise levels to be "an actionable nuisance because of its impediment to the use and enjoyment of
property."3 2 The court indirectly addressed the second Regents
factor when it found no indication of a congressional intent inconsistent with its broad statutory reading. 3
Turning to HAI's arguments, the court quickly rejected the
assertion that the FAA is limited to regulating aircraft noise
through technology certification and in the vicinity of airports
because neither the substance nor the structure of those noise
regulation provisions suggests such limitations. The court then
looked to City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc. to address
HAI's other assertion that air safety is the primary goal of
§ 40103." In Lockheed, the Court was faced with the question of
whether the Act preempted a local ordinance that was intended
to relieve adverse noise effects on residential areas by limiting
aircraft takeoff hours.3 ' The Court examined the Act's legislative
history and found that "the pervasive nature of the scheme of
federal regulation of aircraft noise" revealed Congress's intent
to leave no room for state and local control over aircraft noise.
28 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 595
(1988).
29 Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 Regents of Univ. of Cal., 485 U.S. at 598.
31 See HelicopterAss'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 433-34.
32 Id. at 434.
3 See id.
3 Id.
35 See id.
36 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 625-27

(1973).
3

Id. at 633, 638.
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First, the 1958 Act's Senate Report recognized the FAA's longpossessed role in regulating aircraft flights to control aircraft
noise." Second, during the passage of the 1972 Act, the President and two key congressmen confirmed their intentions to
vest the FAA with regulatory authority over "the most significant
sources of noise [that] move in interstate commerce."" In particular, the Court was concerned that the ordinance, if allowed,
"would severely limit the flexibility of [the] FAA in controlling
air traffic flow."4 0 The Court also interpreted § 40103's predecessor to require a "balance between safety and efficiency and
the protection of persons on the ground."' Drawing from Lockheed's interpretation, the D.C. Circuit implicitly recognized
safety, efficiency, and protection as separate goals for § 40103's
air traffic regulation.
In its discussion of HAI's arguments, the court also addressed
dictum from the First Circuit that provided a contrary view of
the scope of the FAA's authority." In DiPerri v. FAA, the First
Circuit initially suggested that the FAA's failure to alter aircraft
patterns "to avoid causing a nuisance to the residents" indicated
that § 40103's predecessor could have provided injunctive relief
to the plaintiffs." However, the court later dismissed this suggestion because (1) the Act appeared to be concerned with safety,
rather than noise, and (2) Congress's subsequent enactment of
aircraft noise regulation in a different section of the Act implied
its intent to use this latter section as the proper vehicle for noise
abatement. 5 After interpreting § 40103's language and rejecting HAI's assertions, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the First Circuit's "unpersuasive" view as well as its reliance on an
incomplete legislative history.4 6
Turning to Chevron's second step of its two-part analysis, the
court concluded that even if Congress is silent on the precise
question, the FAA's regulation is "reasonable and consistent"
with the provisions cited in HAI's assertions. Specifically, HAI
failed to establish that Congress did not intend to address air38 Id. at 635-38.

3 Id.
40 Id. at 639.
41 Id. at 638-39 (citation omitted).
42 See Helicopter Ass'n Int'l v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
4 Id.
4
DiPerri v. FAA, 671 F.2d 54, 56-57 (1st Cir. 1982).
45

Id.

46

Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 434.
Id. at 435.

4
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craft noise through air traffic flights and certification.4 8 In
reaching its holding, the court also addressed another case cited
by HAI involving the Enviromental Protection Agency (EPA).4
In American PetroleumInstitute v. EPA, the EPA relied on a federal
statute to prescribe a regulation that would not necessarily reduce harmful volatile organic compound (VOC) and toxic emissions."o However, a relevant section in the statute
unambiguously directed the agency to set regulations for reducing VOC and toxic emissions." The court apparently invoked
Chevron's first step to reverse the regulation because the EPA's
regulation was contrary to Congress's explicit intent.52 The D.C.
Circuit distinguished American Petroleum from the case at issue
because, in the instant case, the FAA did not "flout[ ] a congressionally imposed restriction" in the Act.53
The D.C. Circuit correctly refused to limit the scope of
§ 40103(b) (2). Doing otherwise would contravene Congress's
clear intent to grant the FAA broad authority in controlling aircraft flight." The court's broad reading of § 40103(b) (2) is confirmed not only by the first factor in the Regents test but also by
the Act's conclusive legislative history, i.e., the second factor. 5
First, the House Report characterized the FAA's authority on
the allocation of airspace and management of its use by civil
aircraft as "plenary. "56 Second, the Senate Report and key
figures' statements made before and during the passage of the
Act confirmed the FAA's exclusive control over air traffic flow in
the context of controlling aircraft noise.5 1 Such broad characterizations coupled with the FAA's vested responsibilities supply
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to confer upon
the agency expansive rulemaking authority to combat noise
within the air traffic network.58 Thus, Congress has confirmed
§ 40103's broad scope, which conflicts with HAI's narrow read48

Id.

49 Id.
50

See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

51 Id. at 1120.
52 See id. at 1119-21.
5
54

Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 435.
See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633, 638

(1973).
55

See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589,

594-95 (1988).
5r Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1316 (8th Cir. 1981).
57
58

Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. at 634-38.
See HelicopterAss'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 434-35.
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ing and the DiPerricourt's inadequate analysis of § 40103's legislative history. 9
Further, this case's narrow facts justify the court's holding.
Congress's conscious selection of broad language, such as "aircraft" and "protect," in § 40103(b) (2) demonstrates affirmative
congressional intent to grant the FAA flexible authority to shield
or cover individuals and property on the ground from the detrimental effects of airplanes, helicopters, jets, and other interstate-flying aircraft. 0 Specifically, noise and vibrations created
by aircraft can "render[ ] . . . properties unfit for residential

use."61 In addition, aircraft noise "has been found to cause psychological and physiological damage to [affected Americans']
health and well-being."6 2 In the case at hand, the noise produced by low-flying helicopters has adversely affected Long Island residents' sleep quality, daily activities, and housing for
many years. 3 Because § 40103(b) (2) provides the communities
with a shield from the cumulative adverse effects of helicopter
noise, the injury to Long Island property and residents clearly
falls within the broad coverage of this section.
Likewise, the court properly analyzed Chevron's second step
and contrasted American Petroleumwith the case at hand. First,
assuming arguendo that Congress does not clearly authorize the
FAA's regulation, the regulation would have received deference
under Chevron's second step. 5 The court's deference is particularly appropriate in this context given (1) the FAA's exclusive
authority to regulate the airspace of the United States and (2)
the highly complex field's requirement for advanced air traffic
expertise.6 6 In addition, neither § 40103(b) (1)'s nor § 44715's
language supports an inference that the FAA cannot utilize various methods to regulate aircraft noise. 7 Second, because American Petroleum deals with the EPA's bold disregard of an express
congressional restriction, the court appropriately rejected HAI's
59 See id.
60

See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2) (2006).

Richard Kahn, Comment, Inverse Condemnation and the Highway Cases: Compensationfor Abutting Landowners, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 563, 576 (1995).
62 Falzone, supra note 1, at 770, 784.
63 See supra notes 13, 17 and accompanying text.
64 HelicopterAss'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 433-35.
65 See id. at 433.
66 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
61

844-45 (1984).
67 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103(b) (1), 44715 (2006).
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reliance on that case. 8 In contrast, the instant case deals with
the FAA's promotion of explicit congressional goals set forth in
§ 40103.69 Specifically, the Final Rule furthers § 40103's separate goals: (1) to create certain exceptions and minimize interaircraft interaction, which adequately addresses safety concerns;
(2) to locate a route close to shore that provides efficient use of
aircraft space; and (3) to protect individuals and property on
the ground. 0
In analyzing Chevron's first step, the court incorrectly assumed
that because noise can give rise to "actionable nuisance," Congress intended to authorize the FAA to prescribe air traffic regulation for the very purpose of preventing noise nuisances." The
court failed to consider that "barking dogs, music, windmills,
and loud voices" can also qualify as actionable offenses under
common law nuisance claims. Congress's consciously chosen
"shall prescribe" language in § 40103(b) (2) as opposed to the
shall prescribe "as deem [ed] necessary" language in § 44715
clearly manifests Congress's intent to require the FAA to set air
traffic regulations to protect individuals and property from the
detrimental effects of aircraft noise. Specifically, insignificant
noise levels-similar to barking dogs or music-emitted by aircraft flying at high altitudes hardly "injure, destroy, or detrimentally affect" humans and property on the ground. Assuming
arguendo that the court's nuisance analysis is proper, it would
impose significant burdens on the FAA by requiring the agency
to act every time an aircraft caused a common law nuisance.
Oddly, the court adopted the DiPerricourt's nuisance theory but
rejected DiPerri'sunpersuasive view. 75 However, the court's improper reliance on common law nuisance does not alter the
congressionally explicit goals set forth in the FAA's general authority under § 40103.76 The court stressed that (1) the agency
must exercise its general authority to "balance [ ] safety concerns
appropriately," and (2) § 40103 is limited to situations in which
"reducing noise through altering flight routes can protect propAm. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
HelicopterAss'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 433-34.
70 See The New York North Shore Helicopter Route, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,911,
39,911-13 (July 6, 2012) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
71 See Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 434.
72 John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 282 (2001).
73 Compare 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2006), with 49 U.S.C. § 44175 (2006).
74 See Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 434.
75 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
76 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103.
68

69
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erty on the ground."7 7 The court's emphasis on § 40103's procedural limitations confirms the FAA's limited discretion, provides
protection for the small entities that may be subject to possible
FAA abuse, and encourages the FAA to draft its justifications for
regulations more carefully.78
Critics of this case may argue that the court improperly expanded the FAA's § 40103 authority to the regulation of residential-area aircraft noise, and that the court's decision will
likely have undesirable implications for the helicopter industry
and for the agency because communities around the country
will expect more agency action. 9 However, such critics fail to
consider prior FAA noise-abating air traffic regulations that protect private and public land. For example, the FAA has reduced
the adverse impact of aircraft noise by routing low-altitude terminal traffic away from Oberlin College, by prohibiting helicopters from flying over Mount Vernon, and by banning
commercial air-tour operations over Rocky Mountain National
Park." Given the FAA's long-standing practices, the Final Rule
hardly reflects a change in the agency's enforcement action;
rather, it coincides with the agency's expansive role in managing
airspace to control aircraft noise. Accordingly, this decision will
neither unduly influence the agency's discretion, nor create
"far-reaching consequences for the helicopter industry and
[the] FAA.""'
In sum, the most important and practical implication of this
case is that it advances congressional intent to vest the FAA with
the right to regulate air traffic noise for the protection of the
community. Although helicopters "will [eventually] incorporate
better technology and become less noisy," for now, communities
around the country must rely on the FAA for protection from
the unbearable noise of low-flying helicopters. 8 2 By holding helicopter operators accountable for the excessive noise produced
by their helicopters, the D.C. Circuit incentivizes both cooperation with the FAA in resolving the impact of noise on residential
areas and the production of quieter aircraft.
77 See Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, 722 F.3d at 434 (emphasis omitted).
78 See id. at 433-35.
79 See Gerald F. Murphy & Steven J. Seiden, Regulating Annoyance: FA's North
Shore HelicopterRoute Final Rule, 26 No. 2 AIR & SPACE LAw. 4, 7 (2013).
80 The New York North Shore Helicopter Route, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,911, 39,911 &
n.I1 (July 6, 2012) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
81 See Murphy & Seiden, supra note 79, at 7.
82 The New York North Shore Helicopter Route, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,911 at 39,913.
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